Political Economy versus the Political Dimensions of Development
Everyday operations of local and national governments,
affect prices, production, profits, wages, and almost every other aspect of the
economy. Wage, price, and rent controls; taxation; incentives and subsidies;
tariffs and other barriers to trade; and government spending all serve to mold
modern economies and the functioning of markets themselves (Frieden,
2004, p. 2).
Political pressure groups, politicians, and government
bureaucrats have at least as much effect on economic outcomes as do the laws of
the marketplace (Frieden,
2004, p. 3).
The meaning of Underdevelopment
The list of difficulties and challenges in the developing
world remains immense, though there have also been significant gains. In recent
decades there have been: famines in North Korea, East Timor, Ethiopia and
several other African nations (most of them worsened by government policies);
extended rebellions and civil wars in Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Congo,
and Somalia; growing economic inequalities in Mexico and much of Latin America;
warfare between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims in Iraq; continuing political repression
in Myanmar (Burma), Saudi Arabia, and many other nations. To many Westerners,
these nations seem to be constantly in crisis (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 460).
At the same time, however, developing nations have made
important political and economic progress in a number of areas—achievements
that are less likely to make headlines in the Western media but which are often
more important. Democratic government has spread broadly in Latin America,
Asia, and parts of Africa, while military rule has waned. The number of ethnic
conflicts in Africa and Asia, though still sizeable, has actually decreased.
There has been a substantial decline in the percentage of the Third World’s
population living in extreme poverty, while literacy rates and life expectancy
have grown. Efforts by governments and private nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) promise to reduce the worldwide rate of malaria and other fatal diseases
(Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 460).
Most countries share some important elements of social,
economic, or political underdevelopment, including substantial illiteracy (even
in wealthier Third World nations such as Saudi Arabia), great economic
vulnerability (a drop in world coffee prices, for example, can severely damage
the Kenyan economy), sharp social and economic
inequalities (Brazil), political corruption (the Philippines and Sudan),
and authoritarian government (Singapore and Syria). In most of the
less-developed countries
(LDCs), several factors, such as poverty, illiteracy,
ethnic conflict, foreign intervention, and sharp class divisions, combine to
produce political instability, government repression, or both (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 462).
What accounts for the Third World’s political and
economic underdevelopment? No single answer suffices. To begin our analysis, we
define and examine two distinct, but closely related, phenomena: socioeconomic underdevelopment and political underdevelopment (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 462).
Economic and Social Underdevelopment
A country’s per capita income gives us some measure of
its standard of living, but not a full understanding. A second important factor
is the way in which that income is distributed. Two countries may have the same
average incomes, but if income is more heavily concentrated (in the hands of
the rich) in one of them, it will have more people living in poverty (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 463).
For example, in Brazil the richest 20 percent of the
population receives 61.1 percent of the country’s annual income (USD9,370),
while the poorest 20 percent of the population earns a mere 2.8 percent. The richest 20 percent of Brazil’s population
earns 21.8 times as much as does the poorest 20 percent. By contrast, in Egypt
the richest 20 percent of the population earns only 5.1 times as much as the
poorest segment. So, although Brazil has an average annual income about double
Egypt’s (USD5,400), the poorest Egyptians are actually better off than their
Brazilian counterparts since they earn more than three times as high a share of
national income (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 463).
Several factors underlie the high rates of inequality in
many least developed countries (LDCs). On the one hand, per capita incomes in
the more economically developed cities tend to be as much as four or five times
greater than in rural areas. Within the countryside itself, particularly in
much of Latin America and parts of Africa and Asia, land ownership is highly
concentrated. That combination of urban-rural income inequality and disparities
in rural land ownership keeps the rural poor at the bottom of the income
ladder. It also helps drive the enormous migration from countryside to city
that has taken place in so many developing nations. As some Third World cities
have doubled their populations in little more than a decade, sprawling slum
neighborhoods have developed, usually lacking adequate sanitation or water
facilities (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 466).
For instance, the 2015 World Bank Report shows that Kiambu
County has a GDP per capita of $1,785 followed by Nyeri ($1,503), Kajiado
($1,466), Nakuru ($1,413), and Kwale ($1,406). Counties located in Kenya’s arid
and semi-arid lands, including Mandera ($267), Bomet ($282), Elgeyo Marakwet
($293), Samburu ($298) and West Pokot with $307 dominate the bottom end of the
list. The report, however, dismisses the common belief that Nairobi, has the
highest concentration of Kenya’s wealth – having clocked a per capita wealth of
$1,081 to finish in eighth position, one spot ahead of Mombasa with a GDP per
capita of $935. The report puts Nairobi’s share of Kenya’s GDP at 12.7 per
cent, dispelling the notion that the city accounts for more than 60 per cent of
national output (Herbling,
2015).
Political Underdevelopment and Development
Fundamental
Definitions: Nations suffering from low political development— most notably
in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East—often have created their current
government institutions—such as parliament or the bureaucracy—relatively
recently compared to many Western nations that have had their major
institutions for centuries. Consequently, their institutions have not been
around long enough to have acquired their own traditions, while much of the
population has yet to develop respect for them. If they perform poorly or are
corrupt, their legitimacy is weakened even further (Ethridge & Handelman,
2010, p. 467).
Second, in developed countries, most political
participation takes place “within the system”—that is, within regularized and
legal channels such as elections or lobbying. In contrast, political activity
in many LDCs is often non-legal or even violent. For example, the conflicting
needs and interests of different ethnic groups may be solved peacefully through
existing political institutions or, if those institutions cannot resolve them,
they may erupt into violence. More politically advanced Third World countries,
such as Costa Rica and the Bahamas, have made progress relatively peacefully
through interest group politics, negotiation, and legislation. By contrast,
where within-system solutions have failed—as in Congo, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, and
Indonesia—political tensions have often provoked bloody conflict (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 467).
Finally, less-developed governments often lack the
capacity to govern effectively. They may have great difficulty collecting
necessary taxes, responding effectively to emergencies, or maintaining order.
During the 1970s, Nigeria and Mexico, major petroleum exporters, accumulated
considerable wealth from their petroleum exports and appeared on the verge of
an economic takeoff. But excessive external borrowing, wasteful spending,
ineffective administration, and corruption all caused their governments to
squander many of their opportunities and to plunge the countries into extended
economic declines (Ethridge & Handelman, 2010, p. 467).
Democracy and
Development Before the late 1980s, most political scientists stressed two
goals of political development: achieving political stability and establishing
effective governments. More important, many of them suggested that achieving
stability was the first priority, and other goals—such as democracy, social
justice, and equity—would have to follow later. Some observers questioned
whether democracy was yet attainable in Third World settings or even desirable
at that time. In recent years, however, troubled by the numerous instances of government
repression in the LDCs, a growing number of analysts have concluded that
democracy and social equity must be integral parts of political development (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 467).
Amartya Sen, the winner of a Nobel Prize in Economics, has
provided one fascinating case for democracy. He notes that among the many
famines that have occurred in the Third World, none has ever taken place in a
democratic country with a free press. Even when democracies such as India and
Botswana have experienced natural disasters such as droughts or floods,
domestic and foreign public opinion (informed by a free press) have ensured
that their governments take appropriate actions to avert famine (Ethridge &
Handelman, 2010, p. 468).
On the other hand, dictatorships in countries such as
Ethiopia and Sudan have frequently ignored or covered up famines or even
enhanced them when they have killed people in “enemy” regions or ethnicities.
For example, the Nigerian military government used famine as a method of subduing
the Ibo break-away state of Biafra (in the 1960s), while the Sudanese regime’s
currently limits foreign food aid to Darfur, where several rebel groups operate
(Ethridge & Handelman, 2010, p. 468).
Theories of Underdevelopment and Development
Why is it that some countries have developed their
political and economic systems while others are still struggling? Over the
years, analysts have offered two distinct explanations. The first insists that
political and economic developments are driven primarily by domestic factors
(within the Third World), most notably changes in the country’s cultural
values. The second approach emphasizes the effects of international trade and
investment, suggesting that external exploitation is the primary cause of Third
World underdevelopment. These approaches are called, respectively,
modernization theory and dependency theory (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 471).
Modernization Theory and the Importance of Cultural Values
In the decades after World War II, as the demise of
European colonialism produced a host of newly independent nations in Africa and
Asia, Western social scientists formulated an understanding of development and
underdevelopment known as modernization theory. Despite the tremendous array of
problems facing the Third World, modernization theorists were initially
relatively optimistic about its prospects for development. They expected that
most LDCs could follow a path of economic and political modernization roughly
parallel to that which had earlier been traveled by Western industrial
democracies (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 471).
Modernization theory focused on the diffusion of modern
ideas both from the developed world to the developing world and, within the
Third World, from city to countryside. Western foreign aid, trade, and
institutions such as the Peace Corps could help speed the process. At the core,
then, it envisioned modernization, in part, as a process of getting developing
nations to think and act “more like us.” “As time goes on,” Marion Levy
predicted, “they and we will increasingly resemble one another. . . . The more highly
modernized societies become, the more they resemble one another.” (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 472).
Along with modern values, LDCs need to develop more
specialized and more complex political and economic institutions. They need to
develop trained bureaucracies, where merit determines promotions, rather than
connections, and which bases decisions on universally applied standards. They
also must create a modern legal system in where decisions are made fairly and
in which the defendant’s ethnicity and socioeconomic status do not determine
the outcome. And political parties have to effectively channel popular demands
and aspirations to the government (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 472).
In time, many of the early assumptions of modernization
theory had to be modified. Initially, it had been too optimistic in its view of
political and socioeconomic change, assuming that modernizing countries could
simultaneously and relatively smoothly achieve economic growth, greater
equality, democracy, stability, and greater national autonomy. As Samuel
Huntington has noted, the theorists erroneously assumed that “all good things
go together.” Eventually, a more sophisticated and pessimistic form of
modernization theory emerged, asserting that change is often a painful and
disruptive process involving difficult choices. Indeed, although modernity is
associated with political stability, the painful transition from traditional
society to modern society, said Huntington, is often profoundly destabilizing.
In countries such as South Korea and Brazil, social and economic modernizations
were initially spurred by authoritarian governments rather than by democracy (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 472).
Dependency Theory
Beginning in the 1950s, a number of social scientists,
primarily in Latin America and the United States, raised more fundamental
objections to modernization theory. Under the banner of dependency theory, they
challenged most of its fundamental assumptions (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 472).
To begin with, they rejected the notion that LDCs could
follow the same path to development as Western nations had. When Great Britain
became the world’s first industrial power, they noted, it had faced no external
competition. In today’s world, nations trying to industrialize have to compete
against well-established industrial giants. In addition, argued Theotonio Dos
Santos, LDCs have to borrow capital and must purchase advanced technology from
the developed world, thereby making them dependent on external economic forces
and ultimately weakening their growth (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 472).
Whereas modernization theorists generally saw Western
influence in the Third World as beneficial, so-called dependencistas insisted that it was Western colonialism that had
turned Africa and Asia into poorly paid sources of cheap food and raw materials
for the colonial powers. And long after Third World nations had achieved
political independence, they remained economically and politically dependent on
the developed world. Production and export of manufactured goods—the most
profitable economic activities—were allegedly confined to the highly
industrialized democracies, called “the
core.” Third World nations (“the periphery”) were largely relegated to the
production and export of food and raw materials, condemned to trade for
industrial imports on unfavorable terms (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, pp. 472, 473).
In the political realm, dependency theorists insisted
that Third World economic elites, backed by the economic and military power of
the “core nations,” maintained a political system that benefited the few at the
expense of the majority. Dependency theory was obviously an attractive model
for Third World scholars, suggesting that underdevelopment was not the LDCs’
fault, but, rather, the result of foreign exploitation. But in U.S.
universities, as well, dependency theory challenged and sometimes displaced
modernization theory as the major scholarly explanation of underdevelopment (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 473).
In his more sophisticated version of dependency theory,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso rejected the contention that all Third World
countries were condemned to underdevelopment. Drawing heavily from the
experience of his native Brazil, Cardoso contended that the active intervention
of the state and the linking of domestic firms with multinational corporations
could allow some LDCs to industrialize and enjoy considerable economic growth.
He referred to this process as “associated-dependent development.” (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 473).
Cardoso noted that countries such as Brazil, Colombia,
and Mexico could industrialize while remaining dependent on multinationals in
the “core” for investment, credit, and technology. Nevertheless, he and other
critics viewed that kind of development as undesirable in several ways. The
engines of such growth, they charged, were frequently mechanized companies that
did not hire sufficient local labor and produced more profitable—hence more
expensive—goods that benefited middle- and upper-class consumers but were
beyond the reach of the masses. Indeed, instead of reducing poverty, dependent
development had allegedly contributed to a growing income gap between the poor
and the more affluent classes. At the same time, an alliance of many Third
World economic, political, and military elites with multinational corporations
helped keep unrepresentative regimes in power (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 473).
Modernization Theory and Dependency Theory Compared
Dependency theory offered a useful correction to
modernization theory in various ways. It highlighted an important influence on
Third World societies that previously had been largely neglected—the role of
international trade, finance, and investment. Eventually, modernization
theorists came to recognize that development required more than adopting new
values or changing domestic political structures. Thus, dependency theory
shifted the focus of research on the Third World from overwhelmingly internal
factors to greater recognition of international influences (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 473).
Dependency theorists also helped redefine the concept of
economic development. Whereas earlier research had stressed the importance of
economic growth, dependencistas
emphasized the significance of economic distribution. When rapid economic
growth produces increased concentration of wealth and income, as has frequently
happened, the poor may even end up worse off. Influenced by dependency theory
and similar critiques, even establishment groups such as the World Bank
reoriented their goals toward “redistribution with growth.” (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, pp. 473, 474).
But just as modernization theorists tended to
overemphasize the internal causes of underdevelopment, early dependencistas erroneously attributed
virtually all Third World problems to external economic forces. LDCs were often
portrayed as virtually helpless pawns with little hope for development. Cardoso
refined the theory by insisting that developing nations had options within the
broad limits of dependency. With the proper government policies and the
appropriate relationships between social classes, Third World nations could
achieve associated-dependent development (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 474).
But even Cardoso’s refinement fails to explain East
Asia’s spectacular development record since the 1960s. Those economies have
been tremendously dependent— that is, very closely tied to the developed world
(the core) through trade, credits, investment, and technology transfer. Indeed,
they are far more globalized (integrated into the world economy) than any other
part of the developing world. But contrary to what Cardoso and other dependency
theorists had predicted, highly globalized economies in East and Southeast Asia
have been the economic stars of the Third World, coupling astonishing economic
growth with comparatively equitable economic distribution (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 474).
Political corruption in Developing Countries
Political corruption scandals periodically emerge in
other developed countries such as France, Italy, Japan, and Spain. But
corruption tends to be a particularly insidious problem in developing countries,
both because it tends to be more widespread and because its effects are
especially harmful (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 469).
It is obviously difficult to get precise data or even
very informed estimates of the extent of corruption in a country since bribes,
by nature, are transacted secretly. However, the most respected information on
the extent of corruption and the degree of government transparency (a measure
of how openly government decisions are made) is published by a Berlin-based
organization called Transparency International (TI). TI gathers information on
the extent of corruption by politicians and other public officials in some 180
nations worldwide based on the perceptions of resident and foreign country
experts and resident businessmen evaluating their own country. Each country is
then given a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score ranging from 0 (extremely
corrupt) to 10 (extremely clean) (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 469).
Why is corruption so much more pervasive in poor,
developing countries? One partial explanation is that many of them have yet to
develop a civic culture that frowns on bribes and other forms of corruption,
and stresses government accountability (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 469).
A second factor in the poorest nations is that their
economies are so weak that there are few opportunities in the private sector to
become wealthy or even well-off. Moreover, foreign companies often dominate the
few opportunities available. So, wielding political power becomes one of the
few paths to wealth for an enterprising individual. That is, the kind of
entrepreneurial spirit that might lead a young German or American to start his
or her company, go to business school, or take a job with a large corporation,
might lead their counterparts in Chad or Laos to become public officials (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, pp. 469, 470).
Finally, it is important to recognize that not all Third
World governments (and certainly not all public officials in the LDCs) are
corrupt. A number of developing countries—such as Botswana, Chile, Barbados,
Taiwan, Uruguay, and the United Arab Emirates, Singapore,
and Hong Kong—have comparatively clean governments according to TI data (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 470).
Public Service Accountability
Accountability may be defined as “a social relationship
in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her
conduct to some significant other.” This definition implies a relationship in
which “some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards,
to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these
standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met.” (Akech,
2011, p. 345).
The immediate post-colonial public service that the first
Kenyan independent government inherited from the British was modeled according
to the Westminister-Whitehall tradition (Hyden 1970; quoted in Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003). This was a public service that was guided by the professional ethics of
impartiality, effectiveness and discipline in the management of public affairs.
Its primary function was to implement government policies efficiently and
effectively. And in undertaking this function, it was expected to be
non-partisan (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 119).
At independence, the first independent government adopted
the strategy of Africanisation or Kenyanisation. But the way in which the
strategy was implemented eventually undermined accountability in the public
service (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 119).
When the Africanisation of the public service began
immediately after independence, it assumed an ethnic, nepotic and patrimonial
dimensions (Patrimonialism is a form of governance in which all power flows
directly from the leader). Indeed, the first Africans that were appointed into
the key position that were vacated by the departing senior white colonial
public servants were predominantly drawn from the members of the Kikuyu
community (Anyang Nyong'o, 1989; quoted in Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003).
Thus, from the very beginning, meritocracy as an
objective principle for appointment and promotion in the public service began
to be abused (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 119).
It is apparent that the reason the KANU ruling elite
Africanised the senior positions in the public service mainly with those who
were related or close to them, and at the same time transferred most of the
state power to the control of this category of public servants, was to ensure
that state power was placed firmly in the hands of those who had direct loyalty
to the person of the president and other individuals in ruling elite circles.
The ultimate goal of this strategy was to establish a secure autocratic state.
This goal was successfully achieved after the 1969 general election (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 120).
In order to ensure that the loyalty of this new crop of
public servants to the person of the president was guaranteed and the
status-quo was maintained, it was necessary to also make them have a stake in
the economy. The Africanisation of the economy provided the best opportunity
for achieving this goal (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 121).
Thus, in 1970 the president appointed a commission to
investigate the appropriate structure and remuneration of the public service.
The Commission was headed by the then governor of Central Bank, Duncan Ndegwa.
After undertaking its task, the Commission submitted its report to the
president in May 1971. One of the Key recommendations that the Commission made
was that public servants could hence forth be allowed to own private property
and run businesses. This recommendation was a major departure from the known
universal principle that does not allow professional public servants to own
private property or engage in business. This is because by owning private
property or engaging in business, a public servant is likely to abuse his
public position (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 121).
In 1979, a presidential committee chaired by S.N. Waruhiu
to investigate the state of the public service stated in its report:
We have received overwhelming evidence to the effect that some public servants utilize government facilities in order to benefit themselves. Some are said to tender for government supplies and to see to it that their tenders are always successful. Others are said to be in the habit of accepting rewards for work that they are paid to do by the government. We have been told that most salesmen particularly in the field of the now popular turn-key projects offer reward to public servants who thus become obliged to see that decisions are made in favour of those who offer rewards. It has also been suggested that in the field of purchasing, commission are paid into bank accounts maintained by Public Servants abroad. Reward for work that the public servant is already paid to do and receiving bribes are acts of Wanton corruption (Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003, p. 122).
Initially, when he assumed the presidency, president Moi
promised that he would eradicate corruption and abuse of office in the public
service (Kibwana et.al 1996; quoted in Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003). In August 1982,
just four years into his presidency and before he could consolidate himself in
power, a section of the army staged a coup attempt against the president's
leadership. The uprising was swiftly crushed, but after the coup attempt, it
dawned on Moi that his immediate priority was to consolidate himself in power (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 122).
Moi resorted to the patron-client relations strategy that
his predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, had successfully used in the 1960s. However, in
implementing this strategy, Moi lacked the overwhelming opportunities that
Kenyatta enjoyed (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 122).
In the first place, unlike Kenyatta who hailed from a
more populous community that was also endowed with a large number of public
servants that had been inherited from the colonial period, President Moi hails
from the minority Tugen community that had also largely lagged behind during
the colonial period. Secondly, when Kenyatta took over power, he had at his
disposal a lot of public resources, especially the former white owned farms,
that he could dish out to public officials in key positions in order to buy
their loyalty. In the case of Moi, when he came to power most of such public
resources had generally dwindled (Barkan, 1992; quoted in Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003).
Given the circumstances, it meant that if Moi had to
appoint those who were closely related to him into key positions in the public
service, then he was bound to appoint people with lesser qualifications and
experience than had been the case during Kenyatta's period. Secondly, if he had
to continue to buy the loyalty of those he appointed into key positions in the
public service, then he was bound to look for resources elsewhere (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 122).
Moi solved the dilemma by resorting to appointing people
with much more inferior qualifications and experience mostly from his wider
Kalenjin community, into the key positions of the public service. He also
turned a blind eye to the widespread culture whereby public officials found it
quite normal to use their public positions to allocate themselves government
land, commercial plots and houses, and to acquire easy loans from government
controlled financial institutions without appropriate collateral. All these
practices generally undermined accountability in governance (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 123).
As Koigi wa Wamwere once noted ‘President Moi privatised
power and property to serve his personal ends. President Moi acts as if what
belongs to the state is his. This is why African presidents like Moi are richer
and more powerful than the governments they lead.’ (wa
Wamwere, 1990, p. 19).
Corruption in Kenya
Article 10(2)(b) states that the national values and
principles of governance include ‘integrity’ and ‘transparency’ (Republic
of Kenya, 2013, p. 15). Article 201 states that ‘all aspects of public
finance’ should be guided by ‘accountability’ and the promotion of ‘an
equitable society’ (Republic
of Kenya, 2013, p. 122).
Michela Wrong suggests that corruption is prevalent in
Kenya because ethnic cabals believe that it is their “turn to eat” once they
assume the reins of government. However, these explanations may be symptomatic
of a much deeper problem, namely institutional failure (Akech,
2011, p. 343).
Graft is a feature of life in Kenya at all levels, from
the daily interaction of citizens with policemen and public servants to the
elaborate networks of patronage and influence linking state and commercial
sectors (Harrington
& Manji, 2013, p. 4).
Corruption is estimated to account for 8% of gross
domestic product (Mwangi, 2008: 281; quoted by Harrington & Manji, 2013).
Kenyan Treasury estimates show that at least 20–30 percent of budgeted monies
are lost each year through rigged bidding, fraudulent procurement and so on
(Kariuki, 2011: 60; quoted by Harrington & Manji, 2013).
Land grabbing, which was inaugurated by colonialism in
Kenya, has continued in diverse forms since independence (Harbeson, 2012;
Boone, 2012; quoted by Harrington & Manji, 2013).
Those seeking hard data concerning corruption, should
examine the Report of Commission of
Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, more widely
known as the Ndung’u Report (Harrington
& Manji, 2013, p. 13).
Its report, made public in 2005, provides a detailed
account of the illegal land awards made over the years to the families of
President Kenyatta and President Moi, to numerous former ministers, members of
parliament and civil servants, as well as to individuals in the military and
the judiciary (Harrington
& Manji, 2013, p. 13).
The Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing mega-scandals provide
significant insights into the relationship between corrupt political financing
and democracy in Kenya, demonstrating that pursuit and use of illegal campaign
funds has negative effects on democratic politics (Mwangi,
2008, p. 267).
Money obtained from the state through Goldenberg was used
to finance KANU in the multiparty general elections in 1992. Pattni confirmed
this during the hearings of the Goldenberg Commission of Inquiry set up in
2003. Goldenberg and its sister companies received US$116 million by way of
pre-shipment finance (Mwangi,
2008, p. 273).
Part of these funds, among other sources, was used for
the elections. Goldenberg bought large amounts of food and cars for voters and
candidates during the electioneering period. The food was distributed in
famine-stricken areas (Mwangi,
2008, p. 273).
In the case of Anglo Leasing scam, 18 separate contracts
involving Anglo-Leasing worth over US$740 million were signed by the government
between 1997 and 2003. Some of these were completed prior to January 2003,
while others were cancelled by the government. A total of US$243 million had
been spent on these contracts as at May 2005. Of this, US$14 million was
refunded by companies in unusual circumstances on account of three projects
managed by Infotalent and Anglo-Leasing and Finance (Mwangi,
2008, p. 275).
The post-2002 Anglo-Leasing deals were perpetuated by
senior cabinet ministers and bureaucrats in the Kibaki administration to raise
money for political activities, in particular campaign funds for party and
general elections in 2007 (Mwangi,
2008, p. 276).
Among the senior cabinet ministers allegedly involved in
the scandal were Minister for National Security Chris Murungaru, Finance
Minister David Mwiraria, and Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs
Kiraitu Murungi. Some of the senior bureaucrats allegedly involved were the
Head of the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet, Francis Muthaura, and
President Kibaki's aide, Alfred Getonga (Githongo, 2005; quoted by Mwangi,
2008).
According to the former permanent secretary for
governance and ethics in the Office of the President, John Githongo, who was
Kenya's anti-corruption adviser, the transactions of Anglo-Leasing were
primarily meant to raise funds for both party and general elections. The
ministers were part of a NARC insiders' group which pushed for payment of a
questionable US$55 million naval ship contract, from which the party hoped to
receive campaign funds. This was openly admitted to him in one of the meetings
he held with one of the ministers on I September 2004 (Mwangi,
2008, p. 276).
Implications of corruption
It has negatively impacted on meaningful political
participation and competition. Funds raised in a manner that lacks transparency
and accountability or that is shrouded in secrecy discourage participation in
political parties (Mwangi,
2008, p. 277).
It has made Kenyan politics a market place where
positions go to the highest bidder, making elections a money issue and locking
out worthwhile contenders who can add value. It has also created a system where
getting into politics is a business venture, with business plans and an
expected rate of return on investment. This 'is best indicated by what has
become the norm, calling every rich person mheshimiwa
(Honourable), whether they are political leaders or not (Mwangi,
2008, p. 278).
The negative impact of the role of money in politics in
Kenya is also highlighted in a study conducted by the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) on party financing in 22 countries. This points out that money
in politics has had a negative impact, since excessive campaign funds have
limited the independence of candidates and restricted the participation of
vulnerable groups such as women and youth in running for office (Mwangi,
2008, p. 278).
When the state uses resources in partisan campaigns, it
diverts resources that could be used for development needs. This unfavourably
affects the realization of socio-economic rights which is an obligation of the
state (Mwangi,
2008, p. 279).
Transparency and accountability in state institutions has
also been adversely affected by political corruption. Decisions have been taken
and enforced in a manner that does not follow established rules and
regulations. State institutions have not, therefore, been accountable to the
public as well as to their stakeholders, making them unresponsive. This in turn
has eroded the legitimacy of such institutions and the state at large. Such
institutions facing legitimacy crises include the legislature, the judiciary
and other state institutions that are meant to play a key role in the fight
against corruption (Mwangi,
2008, p. 280).
Causes of Deterioration in Public Accountability in Kenya
In the case of Kenya, the deterioration of public service
accountability may be attributed to the following factors:
a)
The autocratic or patron-client relations
political process;
b)
The involvement of public servants in private
business;
c)
Poor terms and conditions of service;
d)
Deterioration of professionalism in the public
service;
e)
Ethnicity and nepotism;
f)
The Ineffectiveness of Watchdog of institutions;
g)
Selective application of sanctions;
h)
The lack of incentives for good performance;
Autocracy or the Politics of Patron-clientilism
An autocratic system is also usually characterized by the
patron – client relation political process. This is a political process in
which the political leader (in this case, the president) recruits his/her close
confidants who normally represent different constituencies (ethnic or racial
communities and regions) and place them into key political, administrative and
judicial positions. Since the close confidants owe their appointments into the
key positions to the leader, their loyalties are also direct to the leader (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 129).
The Involvement in Private Business by Public Servants
Involvement in private business by public servants
coincided with the period when the Africanisation of the economy was still
going on. Given the circumstances, a number of public servants in key positions
took advantage of the programme to Africanise various businesses and properties
to themselves. In the process, acquiring private property and running businesses
of any kind became the norm in the civil service. There is absolutely no doubt
that the involvement in private businesses by public servants has resulted in
widespread corruption and abuse of office (Waruhiu Committee Report, 1980
quoted in Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003).
Deterioration of Professionalism in the Public Service
Frequent shuffling of senior civil servants and bringing
in people from outside the mainstream public service to fill key position
grossly undermined the morale of civil servants who had worked diligently,
marking time with the hope that one day they would rise to the top. Having been
demotivated, a number of public servants found it justified to use their
positions while they still occupied them, to enrich themselves. This involved the
abuse of office since one was no longer sure when he or she would be shuffled
to another assignment or be dismissed from the public service altogether (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 132).
Poor Terms and Conditions of Public Service
Given the extended family factor and the kind of social
status that the society expects from a public servant, the public servant is
often forced to look for other sources of income to satisfy the social
pressure. The other sources of income are normally likely to be private
business or abuse of office (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 134).
Ethnicity and Nepotism
When one is appointed into position of authority in the
public service on the basis of ethnicity and nepotism, it becomes almost
impossible for such a person to see anything wrong in also using the same
criteria to distribute public resources or dispense public services to the
public (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 134).
The Ineffectiveness of Watchdog of Institutions
The watchdog institutions charged with the
responsibilities of controlling public service ethics in Kenya are Parliament,
Police, Anti-Corruption Unit, Monitoring Unit and the Judiciary. However, all
these institutions have proved generally ineffective in controlling public
service ethics (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 135).
Selective Application of Sanctions
In order to enhance public service ethics among public
servants, there must be certain sanctions to be meted against a public servant
who fails to obey the codes of ethics or break the relevant laws. Such
sanctions must be applied impartially and uniformly to all public servants. But
when they are applied selectively, then they are likely to have no effect (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 138).
The Lack of Incentives for Good Performance
Whereas it is important to apply sanctions uniformly and
impartially against all public servants who break the codes of ethics, it also
pays to extend incentives to the good performers. Incentives need not
necessarily be material benefits or cash rewards; a letter of commendation, or
a free holiday with pay could also suffice (Odhiambo-Mbai,
2003, p. 138)
Recent Developments and Future Trends
The road to development has been more difficult to travel
than many Third World leaders or outside analysts had originally imagined.
Africa remains the most impoverished region in the developing world—devastated
by civil war, dictatorship, and corruption. Famine, the result of war and
government policy, as well as of natural disasters, continues to plague parts
of countries such as Somalia, Malawi, and Sudan (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 490).
Since the 1990s there have been some signs of improvement
in both economic and political development. South Africa has created a vibrant
multiracial democracy, which, whatever its limitations and current problems,
has impressively reduced racial antagonisms. Between 1988 and 1994 alone, the
number of electoral democracies on the African continent rose from 5 to 21 (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 490).
In its most recent rankings, Freedom House rated 11
sub-Saharan African nations as “Free,” 23 as “Partly Free,” and 15 as “Not
Free.” At the same time, with some notable exceptions, African economies have
experienced one of their longest periods of sustained growth. The continent’s
annual economic growth rate, which averaged 2.7 percent in the 1990s, has
jumped to over 4 percent since 2000 (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 490).
Still, with populations growing at annual rates of 3
percent or more in countries such as Madagascar, Congo, Uganda, and Liberia,
economic growth rates are still struggling to keep up. Moreover, most African
economies remain heavily dependent on a few commodity exports (such as
petroleum, coffee, cocoa, copper, and sugar) (Ethridge
& Handelman, 2010, p. 490).
Although many of the world’s LDCs hope to become “another
Hong Kong” or “another Taiwan,” it is unclear how many will have the internal
capabilities or external possibilities that will permit them to do so.
Prospects for democracy are also clouded. Since the nineteenth century, there
have been three important worldwide waves of democratization (1828–1926,
1943–1962, and 1974–present). The first two advances were followed by more
limited reverse waves back to authoritarianism. So, although worldwide pressure
is growing for Third World governments to democratize and honor human rights
(that is, to join the “Third Wave” of democratization that has changed so many
Eastern European and developing nations), it remains uncertain how effective or
how permanent those pressures will be. In regions such as sub-Saharan Africa,
the movement toward democracy has already weakened. The paths of political and economic
development are challenging, complex, and sometimes difficult to predict. So
far, there has been no reverse wave in the developing world. But opportunities
for further democratization are limited.
